Defensive transitions and high pressing: Why Manchester United should adopt the 4-2-2-2

Change in system and inspiration from Rangnick school of pressing could be the key.

A big thank you to Om Arvind for all the advice, support and motivation on this analysis.

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Teams playing certain systems and structures can take time to implement them, especially so under a new manager. This is precisely what occurred at Manchester United under Marc Skinner.

It took time for the former Orlando Pride manager to get his ideas across to his players and they had some less than desirable results and performances at the start of the season. However, they now seem to be in a good place at the current moment with a settled team and structure.

But, what if there was another system and style that suited this side? When you look at the makeup of the squad there is an argument to be made that another system can be used to get more out of the current squad of players. The biggest concern of United’s season thus far has been their defensive inconsistencies and they need to find a way to improve there. The more you think about it, the more you find that their off-the-ball structure needs fine-tuning in pressing and counter-pressing situations to stop teams from playing through them easily. The 4-2-2-2 seems a logical shift to rectify these issues, so this article will focus on defensive transitions and structure.

So, without further ado, let’s get into it.

The majority of the season has been dominated by the use of the 4-2-3-1 formation. In essence, this is a very attacking structure that allows for four attackers with two sitting midfielders anchoring the team. A lot of their play this season has been focused on getting the ball into central attacking areas using their No. 10 and wide players to play narrower and combine around the half-spaces. Ella Toone has been instrumental in this and Alessia Russo is a focal point coming in off the right or through the middle. The combination play between them has been effective and the supporting act of Leah Galton, Martha Thomas, and Ona Batlle, when she has come forward, has proven to be useful.

Adding in the late runs from central midfield, United have been able to create numerous overloads to create goal-scoring chances. Using the full-backs as added support through both underlaps and overlaps, Skinner has been able to bring about extra points of attack. This has started to work mainly because their midfield double-pivot has settled and the new use of Vilde Bøe Risa as their primary box-to-box midfielder has given United more of an attacking threat. Skinner has attempted to pair Katie Zelem with Lucy Staniforth, Hayley Ladd, and Jackie Groenen but it was Vilde Bøe Risa who finally settled into the role. Their improvements have come from an attacking sense but there are still question marks remaining over how the side defend off the ball, especially in the middle and defensive thirds. What I want to focus on in this article is how to address the defensive deficiencies that have plagued United this season in spite of all their attacking success.

Here are two examples of how United have conceded chances with teams bypassing their midfield. The first against City shows an inconsistent and slow pressing pattern. Groenen closes down Keira Walsh but Alessia Russo’s run towards Ellie Roebuck doesn’t apply much pressure. Subsequently, Caroline Weir is given too much time by Zelem to control, turn, and pass forward. The spaces borne of this pressing structure has meant City can play through United without being put under any excessive pressure with most lanes of passing left still open to them.

Similarly, against Arsenal they allow Jen Beattie time to find her pass but what’s more disturbing is the complete lack of covering the passing lane into Beth Mead. The winger receives it in space though she is then surrounded by three players. In this case, Ladd should have been tighter, anticipating the pass and setting United off in transition. She then proceeds to track Kim Little but is undone by a quick turn while simultaneously Zelem runs towards the same space. This leaves the edge of the box free for Jordan Nobbs to shoot. The lack of coordination and defensive positioning in both scenarios has left United giving away attacking opportunities. This in turn has left United defensively frail and conceding chances.

The common denominator in both these goals is the pressing system or lack thereof. The players are pressing asymmetrically which leads to unwanted space being left open for opposition players to receive, move, and attack. United are not a team filled with speed – especially in midfield – which leaves the onus on counter-pressing to come from the forwards. The problem now is that if a team is good on the ball then United don’t have the coordination to stop them from playing out. There’s instead more individual pressing from the front without players being in sync. Also, given that United’s defensive line is reliant on positional awareness more than speed, it becomes even more imperative that they retain possession higher. This could come down to having a better rest defence which in turn benefits United going forward, but more on this later.

So what is it about the 4-2-2-2 that will give Manchester United better defensive solidarity? We need to start from the front. The system breeds central overloads and forwards become the first line of defence. The system synonymous with Ralf Rangnick and later tweaked by Jesse Marsch and Jürgen Klopp is at its core an attacking system through defence. What we mean by this is the system wants to create transitions through intense pressing and counter-presses by winning the ball back quickly, and playing through the half-spaces is vital to its success, and one that United can adopt to good effect.

The front two would press as United would in the 4-2-3-1 with the central attacking midfielder and striker. The move to a 4-2-2-2 would be to alter the pressing shape to accommodate more personnel to add to the press. They are the focal points and the players who need to set the tone for the rest. The two forwards can be positioned to cover shadow passing lanes whilst also trying to press centre-backs to close off any easy passes forward.

The example here showcases what I’ve just explained, where the forward presses towards the centre-back with the ball to try and eliminate the time and space for the defender to react. Here, if you force teams to pass out wide, then you automatically create a natural overload in the wide area when the aforementioned striker and left-sided No. 10 create a 2 v 1 with the central midfielder and full-back pushing up to prevent another easy passing lane. This gives license to the primary presser to go hard from the front without worrying about leaving spaces in behind. The by-product of this is high turnovers and transitioning into a space where the opposition are unsettled.

They aren’t the quickest team and the way they’re set up now means teams can bypass their press due to the slowness in reacting. Despite this, Manchester United’s attacking profiles are fit for purpose and there are individuals who could adapt and adopt this sort of high-intensity pressing style. United average 7.45 PPDA this season which ranks them as the highest with Manchester City in second with 7.92. So there is a method of pressing that does work here, but it hasn’t stopped teams from penetrating the first line of defence.

Toone and Russo have been their best players going forward and can indeed press, but at times look like they’re aimlessly running forward, mainly down to the inconsistencies behind them. Part of the reason to switch to this formation is to allow an extra player in there to help with a coordinated pressing structure. Having a box of four to press in the opposition box and just beyond increases the likelihood of creating pressure and turnovers.

Russo in particular has been very good at cover shadowing, but the lack of close cover in behind makes the press go in vain. Toone has been active in behind as the No. 10, covering the passing lanes to press alongside Russo.

The overarching idea is to create a structure that puts United in a position to win the ball back in any phase of the pitch and it starts with effective positioning from the front. So if Russo was to start on the right of a two, she could pressure the central defender knowing she has two No. 10s and a striker nearby to sweep up.

To some extent, Russo has had some success as is shown here in the clip. She goes in to press the centre-back who delays the pass and gets caught having to go back to her goalkeeper. Russo continues her run and forces another pass to the other central defender. Risa is nearby to add pressure and United win the aerial duel high up the pitch. So there is evidently an element of a high-pressing structure here that did work in due part of having numbers forward and capitalising on Leicester City’s indecisiveness.

However, what makes this a smart move is the signing of Signe Bruun. The on-loan Lyon striker is a very mobile player who is capable of fitting in as a pressing forward. Manchester United’s game against Arsenal, particularly for 45 minutes, was some of the best off-the-ball football they played given how they closed down and troubled the Arsenal players. Bruun was part of the forward line that helped and gave them the impetus for Toone and Russo to follow-up press.

This example shows Arsenal having to take more touches to build up and eventually opt to go long instead after Bruun successfully forces a pass back to Manuela Zinsberger. The same pass goes back and in turn, becomes a long pass which United win back. United’s three forwards were in high positions in a horizontal line which made it difficult for Arsenal to find spaces to play through.

Just behind them, the midfield double-pivot becomes an extension of the way the team presses just further behind. The concept is to provide cover when the forwards and attacking midfielders are pressing and contribute towards good rest defence. The two No. 6s have to be positionally aware and assess the situation in front of them. Again, inherently, the players here are not going to be doing anything radically different but rather, they need to be much more active in their off-the-ball movement to support and be close to potential ball receivers around them.

In this case, Risa and Zelem need to be tight to their midfield counterparts while Galton and Bruun are rushing to close down the ball carrier. If you notice, every United player is looking to get close to and shut down an opposition player. Jesse Marsch’s take on this is the responsibility of the initial pressers is to win the ball and not worry about the passing lanes behind them. This is for the rest of the team to provide adequate support and cover. If Bruun and Galton are not worrying about what’s happening behind them, there is much more focus on trying to win back possession.

This falls on the two No. 6s to ensure that there is little to no space left for the ball receiver to turn and move. The quicker the ball is won back, the more unsettled the opposition team are in their structure. Given United’s pace and creativity on the counter-attack, there is a very good chance for them to score which is an added benefit of having four attackers on the pitch.

I showed an earlier example of how City and Arsenal were able to bypass United’s midfield, but that was more down to lack of movement from the collective front line to stop easy passes into midfield. Yet we do need to talk about how adept Skinner’s current options are to press here. Risa has been proficient in her pressing game having played in a No. 9 position off the ball, coming from deep when trying to stop build up. 

The passage of play I showed earlier highlighting Toone’s pressing and causing a turnover also had Risa as the furthest forward player pressing the centre-backs initially. Zelem is important when it comes to distribution and set-pieces, but her mobility is left much to be desired which raises questions on who needs to start in their double-pivot. This makes the positioning of the players off the ball much more important to both counter-press and transition.

This takes us nicely into rest defence. Now, this concept is about how good a team’s positioning is when possession is regained. It lends itself nicely to immediately put the opposition under pressure as soon as they recover possession to counter-attack.

The defensive line’s biggest problem is their spatial defending. A lot of goals have been scored because the defence hasn’t been able to deal with the pace around them. The goals they’ve conceded are not entirely isolated to the back line, but there seems to be an inability to control play ahead of them when teams attack. 1 v 1s have been a problem across the board, with attackers being able to exploit their positional weaknesses and just their general lack of pace.

These two goals against Manchester City have two similarities. Both have a slightly disjointed back line and in neither situation do the defenders or defensive midfielders close down the ball carriers. Both Caroline Weir and Lauren Hemp had time to compose themselves and find a shooting opportunity.

If we give some benefit of the doubt to Skinner, his No. 6s failed to cover the space between the lines and prevent the ball going out wide in the case of Hemp’s shot. If his defenders have trouble being exposed to quick wingers then the No. 6s in turn need to make the space compact in defensive transition.

However, if United are to switch to a front-foot pressing system then the whole backline needs to step up and be more compact as a whole. The defensive midfielders need to get tight to players in between the lines and ensure they have no time or space to turn, giving them a better window of opportunity to dispossess and transition.

Another risk that makes having a compact and alert rest defence is the flying full-backs forming part of the attack. The heavy wing play from Batlle can have an adverse effect on the rest defence, leaving Manchester United short on numbers on one side. If there is a turnover, the full-back could be out of position with too much distance to cover with the team undone by a single switch of play. Having the full-backs be more positionally cautious to cover for any losses of possession will compensate for better rest defence while maintaining a level of attacking threat. If Batlle can win back possession from the pass into the opposition winger, then United would be in good rest defence to counter-attack and catch them out of position.

Skinner’s ideas are always being tweaked and adjusted and a possible change in the formation and system could turn United into a much harder team to beat, especially against the traditional ‘Top 3’ sides. The attacking combinations have worked well after much experimentation and change, but it’s their defensive structure that still needs improvement which I believe the 4-2-2-2 brings to the table.

Photo by Martin Rickett/PA Images via Getty Images